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INTRODUCTION
If I were to say, “Theory matters”, most people would not find it particularly surprising. In fact, you would 
think it obvious that as a university professor, I would 
make such a statement. But what would your reaction 
be if I were to say, “Theory matters in teaching”? It is 
on this question that I want to dwell in this lecture and 
in particular within the context of teaching law in South 
Africa today.
I shall propose that theory matters very much in 
teaching law in contemporary South Africa, and I shall 
put forward a theoretical framework within which law 
should, in my view, be taught at South African universities. 
I call this framework ‘transformative legal education’, 
and in short it is what I consider law teachers can and 
“must do in order to achieve the aims of transformative 
constitutionalism”.1 I do not propose a new theory, 
but I rather propose a theoretical framework, that is, 
a framework that draws upon a number of insights 
from different disciplines to guide the teaching of law. 
In setting up this framework, I shall focus on three basic 
elements of education, namely 1) the subject matter 
or discipline being taught (here law), 2) the teacher 
or the act of teaching and 3) the student or learner. I 
shall align each of these dimensions of legal education 
with contemporary theories and insights within that 
particular field. All of these I consider to hold profound 
implications for the way that law teachers approach 
their craft. These insights call for a fundamental shift 
from formalistic legal reasoning to substantive reasoning 
under a transformative constitution, for a shift towards 
a constructivist student-centred teaching model and for 
the recognition of a paradigm shift in knowledge from 
linear to nonlinear, relational or complex. In conclusion 
I shall argue that these different insights force us to 
critically reassess our approach to legal education and 
explain how these insights can contribute to a meaningful 
framework within which law can responsibly be taught in 
contemporary South Africa.
A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AS 
THE SUBJECT OF EDUCATION
One of the first scholars to point to the fundamental shift in legal culture that our new constitutional 
dispensation envisaged was Alfred Cockrell. He labels 
the pre-constitutional view of law as a “formal vision of 
law” and notes “factors contributing to this ascendancy 
of the formal vision” as including “an emphasis on 
narrowly-construed ‘private law’ subjects in the training 
of law students; an aversion to the teaching of ‘policy 
matters’ as part of the law syllabus at universities; a 
belief that good lawyering was largely a matter of textual 
exegesis and technical expertise”.2 With reference 
to John Dugard’s inaugural lecture, Cockrell notes 
that this vision “denied a creative role in judicial law-
making”.3 Against this background, he argues that the 
new constitutional dispensation involves “changes ... 
at a deep level within the South African legal system” 
that call for “a substantive vision of law” involving an 
obligation to “engage with ... moral and political values” in 
adjudication.4 In this substantive vision of law, a legal rule 
will only be valid if it “conform[s] in some degree with 
notions of what is substantively right, just or good”.5 But, 
most importantly, it is not merely the acknowledgement 
of such substantive notions behind legal rules that 
characterises the fundamental shift called for in South 
African legal culture but also the open engagement with 
such substantive reasons. Etienne Mureinik labels this 
shift as one from a “culture of authority” to a “culture 
of justification”.6 The new constitutional dispensation 
thus introduces a fundamental shift in legal methodology 
as much as (or perhaps even more than) a shift in sub-
stantive law. As Cockrell rightly points out, this signals a 
“paradigm shift with profound implications”.7 
A number of scholars have put forward similar 
accounts of the fundamental shift in law and our legal 
culture under the new constitutional dispensation. 
Thus, Chief Justice Langa notes that it is “no longer 
sufficient for judges to rely on the say-so of parliament 
or technical readings of legislation as providing justifi-
ca tions for their decisions” but that “judges bear the 
ulti mate responsibility to justify their decisions not 
only by reference to authority, but by reference to 
ideas and values”. 8 One of the most influential of these 
accounts has been Karl Klare’s notion of transformative 
constitutionalism. 9 He describes this notion embodied in 
our constitutional transition as 
a long-term project of constitutional enactment, 
inter pretation, and enforcement committed (not in 
isolation, of course, but in a historical context of 
con ducive poli tical developments) to transforming a 
country’s political and social institutions and power 
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6relationships in a democratic, participatory, and 
egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutio na-
lism connotes an enterprise of inducing large-scale 
social change through nonviolent political processes 
grounded in law.10 
Integral to this project is the open engagement with 
substantive values in justifying legal outcomes. How-
ever, Klare notes a disconnect between the prevailing 
legal culture in South Africa and the commitment of 
the Constitution11 to social change. In particular, he 
notes that despite the “substantively postliberal and 
transformative aspirations”12 of our Constitution, our 
legal culture is still a highly conservative one, meaning 
that South African lawyers instinctively rely on a legal 
methodology that places “relatively strong faith in the 
precision, determinacy and self-revealingness of words 
and texts” and that interpretation of such legal texts is 
“highly structured, technicist, literal and rule-bound” 
with little emphasis on values and policy.13 Instead, 
Klare calls for the development of a legal culture that 
embraces the normative framework put forward by the 
Constitution in its methodology. This involves not only 
overt substantive reasoning but also recognition of the 
possibilities for creativity in applying and developing the 
law to meet the aims of social transformation.
So what are the implications of all of this for legal 
education? That is, what do the fundamental changes in 
our discipline mean for the teaching of that discipline? 
There are a number of fairly obvious responses. Firstly, 
the substance of what is being taught is and should be, 
of course, quite different from what it was in the past. 
New areas of law such as fundamental rights and judicial 
review must be accommodated in the law curriculum, 
and the curriculum should be adjusted to reflect the new 
paradigm based on a supreme justiciable Constitution. 
But also, established areas of law that have been 
fairly settled for a considerable period of time are 
now being transformed in the light of the Constitution. 
Some of the most remarkable examples are the law of 
delict and property.14 Teaching these areas of law is thus 
not business as usual either.15 Students should be 
trained also in these areas, particularly those that have 
not seen the same level of constitutional infusion, 
such as the law of contract,16 to assess long-established 
common-law rules against the values entrenched in the 
Constitution. 
This brings me to the second implication of trans-
formative constitutionalism for legal education. Students 
should be educated not only in the new substance of the 
law but also in the new legal method or reasoning mode. 
As noted above, the new constitutional dispensation 
calls for a substantive mode of legal reasoning. Matters 
of morality and policy, even politics, can no longer be 
excluded from legal analysis. This means that such matters 
should also enter the law lecture hall.17 Law teachers will 
be failing their students if they do not enable them to 
engage with these ostensibly extra-legal considerations 
in dealing with the law. This also requires a much 
greater emphasis on the context in which law operates, 
the society that it intends to regulate, in our case to 
transform. The door of the law lecture hall can no longer 
be shut to what is going on out there. The shift required 
from law teachers to instruct students in this new 
paradigm will in many instances be quite radical, even, as 
Cockrell notes, traumatic.18 It will call into question our 
own professional sensibilities and will require a critical 
self-assessment of whether we are able to engage in the 
kind of value-based reasoning that we are now required 
to teach. It also highlights the need for a much greater 
interdisciplinary approach to legal education. In the first 
instance, law must be presented not as a collection of 
distinct branches, each existing within its own silo, but 
in an integrated fashion that reveals the connections 
among the various branches, especially in relation to the 
shared normative value system that underlies it all (or 
should underlie it), flowing from the Constitution. This 
does not only apply to the distinct substantive branches 
of the law, say contract and administrative law, but also 
the distinct legal traditions coexisting in South Africa. 
While constitutional supremacy implies “one system of 
law”,19 we cannot view that system in the singular. That 
one system is made up of various, sometimes conflicting, 
legal traditions: various forms of common law, customary 
law, religious law and teaching ‘the law’ means coming 
to grips with this plurality.20 Secondly, much more em-
phasis must also be placed on the integration of law with 
other disciplines, obvious examples being economics, 
philosophy, political science, sociology, psychology and 
public administration, to name a few. Without skills 
in these areas, law students will not be equipped to 
engage in the substantive mode of reasoning required 
within transformative constitutionalism. In this package 
of skills that law students should acquire, perhaps the 
most important is that of creativity. As Klare notes,21 
our constitutional drafters could not have envisaged 
that we will transform our society in light of the Con-
stitution with reliance on the same legal rules and 
legal sensibilities of the pre-constitutional era. Our 
constitutional transition challenges us to be creative, to 
imagine new ways of doing things in law. In turn, this 
challenges legal education to foster creativity. We must 
train lawyers to be innovators under the Constitution, 
not simply technicians.22
7As demanding as these implications of our legal 
transition may be for legal education, the biggest challenge 
lies not in what we teach, either in substantive law or 
skills, but in how we teach, that is our methodology in 
legal education. Just as transformative constitutionalism 
requires judges to adjudicate by using not only the new 
rules of our constitutional democracy but also the new 
adjudicative method, our new legal paradigm requires 
law teachers to teach differently. To my mind, this is 
the most important implication of our transition for legal 
education but certainly also the most difficult. As law 
teachers, our legal culture manifests in the way we teach 
and it is thus our teaching methodology that we need 
to critically engage with in order to align what we do 
with the transformative aspirations of our Constitution. 
This is difficult, for as Klare notes, these “characteristic 
rhetorical strategies” and “professional norms” seem 
normal and obvious to us and “in the absence of critical 
self-reflection and/or transformative experience, appear 
to be natural and fixed” rather than contingent and 
culturally situated as they in fact are.23 We may thus not 
be aware of the significant influence that these practices 
have on what we do in class and hence their impact on 
law graduates’ perception of the law and their role in 
society.24 Significantly, these practices can have a limiting 
effect not only on law graduates’ inclination to drive 
transformation but indeed also on their ability to be 
innovators under the Constitution. 
This may seem very abstract, so let me look at 
a few more concrete examples of aligning teaching 
methodology, pedagogy, with transformative constitu-
tionalism. If we want to instil in law graduates the shift 
from a “culture of authority” to a “culture of justi-
fication”, that is an understanding of the validity of a 
legal position not because of the force behind it (e.g. 
as contained in a statute or court judgment) but be-
cause of the sound normative considerations upon 
which it is explicitly based, our pedagogy needs to 
reflect justification and not authority. We should thus 
ask ourselves what perception of law is instilled by a 
methodology that only involves a sage standing on a stage 
and imparting ‘The Law’ to a group of as yet uninitiated 
apprentices. What happens when law students by-
and-large remain passive recipients of information? 
What view do students form of the law when they are 
relentlessly confronted with a preselected package of 
authoritative materials that they should simply learn 
by rote within a rigid curricular structure? What is 
conveyed by an assessment strategy that simply requires 
the replication of the views imparted as authoritative in 
these materials and contact sessions and rewards those 
that get it as close as possible to the original? In my view, 
such practices reflect and thus preserve a culture of 
authority.25 Transformative constitutionalism forces us 
to imagine a different methodology. A methodology that 
enables students to actively participate in developing 
their own understanding of rules against their own but 
critically also others’ background context would aid 
in developing an understanding of the law as socially 
constructed and situated. Such a methodology should 
focus the attention on the assumptions underlying legal 
rules and their normative make-up26 and leave the black-
letter, technical dimension to background learning, hence 
highlighting the importance of the normative justification 
for rules rather than their mere authoritative existence. 
Rather than attempting to present students with a 
coherent, contained body of rules that constitute the 
law, our methodology should present them with the 
fragmented, pluralist, inconsistent and often conflicting 
claims to authority that in aggregate constitute the law. 
The methodology should encourage students to be 
critical and to not simply accept a position because it 
is stated in an ostensibly authoritative source or even 
claimed to be correct by the lecturer. The methodology 
should enable students to not be satisfied with knowing 
what the legal position is but to imagine (also in radical 
terms) what it could be. And, perhaps most importantly, 
our methodology should be explicit. We should explain 
to our students why we do things the way we do and be 
able to justify our methodological choices. By adopting 
such a pedagogy, we will be able to infuse a transformed 
vision of the law, as dictated by our Constitution, in 
the way that students become members of the legal 
community.  
This brings me to our second element in setting 
up a theoretical framework of transformative legal 
education, namely the teacher or the act of teaching. 
The question in this second element is whether there 
is a way to conceptualise a pedagogy that will enable 
us to effectively teach students in law and instil in them 
the new transformative aspirations of our discipline. Put 
differently, what options exist in educational theory that 
can help us construct a pedagogy that complements the 
fundamental shifts in our discipline?
CONTEMPORARY VIEWS OF 
EDUCATION: FROM TRANSMISSION 
TO CONSTRUCTION
One of the most significant developments in theoretical perspectives on learning over the last 
8half century has been the influence of constructivism.27 
Fosnot captures the gist of this theory when she states 
the following: 
Constructivism is a theory about knowledge and 
learning; it describes both what ‘knowing’ is and 
how one ‘comes to know’ ... the theory describes 
knowledge not as truths to be transmitted or 
discovered, but as emergent, developmental, non-
objective, viable constructed explanations by hu-
mans engaged in meaning-making in cultural and 
social communities of discourse. Learning from this 
perspective is viewed as a self-regulatory process of 
struggling with the conflict between  existing personal 
models of the world and discrepant new insights, 
constructing new representations and models of 
reality as a human meaning-making venture with 
culturally developed tools and symbols, and further 
negotiating such meaning through cooperative social 
activity, discourse, and debate in communities of 
practice.28
However, as many scholars in the vast literature 
on constructivism and education have pointed out, 
constructivism is not a theory of teaching; it does not 
present us with a ready-made pedagogy, a “cookbook 
teaching style” or pat set of instructional techniques.29 
Rather, as a theory of learning, of how we manage to 
develop new insight and skills, constructivism holds 
significant implications for teaching. It serves as a point 
of departure upon which a theory of teaching can be 
constructed, as “ground zero” from where teachers can 
develop their pedagogy.30
In my view, constructivism provides us with the 
theoretical paradigm to structure a pedagogy that will 
serve the purposes of transformative legal education. In 
the limited scope of this lecture, it is not possible to 
explore in any depth constructivism in all its many facets 
and strands or even fully its implications for education.31 
I will thus simply point out some key characteristics of 
constructivist thought that bear most pertinently on 
framing transformative legal education. 
Perhaps the best way to capture the core of con-
structivism is the statement, ‘Knowledge is not found but 
made’. This means that when one gains new knowledge, 
one does not simply absorb some objective, fixed set 
of ideas. In this perspective, knowledge is “temporary, 
developmental, socially and culturally mediated and 
thus non-objective”.32 The development of knowledge, 
learning, is accordingly an active and subjective pro-
cess. One learns, or in constructivist terminology 
constructs knowledge, by connecting new experiences 
to one’s existing knowledge base.33 By doing so one 
does “not only add to the original knowledge base but 
also restructure that pre-existing knowledge base”.34 
This subjective process of constructing knowledge 
happens not only at the individual level but also within a 
particular socio-cultural context. As one of the leading 
constructivist educationalists, Paul Cobb, states, “the 
cognitive process, i.e. the individual construction of ... 
knowledge, takes place against a socially constructed 
plane”.35 Knowledge is thus subjective, firstly, because 
it can only be constructed by and exist within the mind 
of the individual knower36 and, secondly, because that 
construction happens within a particular “knowledge 
constructing community”.37 Not only are the tools that 
we utilise to construct new knowledge, that is what 
we consider appropriate mechanisms of engagement, 
socially contingent, but the distinct bodies of knowledge 
that we can engage with, the disciplines, are also 
socially constructed.38 In Cobb’s words, learning is thus 
“both a process of self-organization and a process of 
enculturation”.39 
The implications of these constructivist insights for 
teaching are quite radical. One of the most important 
implications is that teaching can no longer be viewed 
as a transmission exercise, that is an activity in which 
a knowledgeable teacher transmits discrete bits of 
information to students who duly absorb it. In the words 
of another leading constructivist, Ernst von Glasersfeld, 
as teachers “[w]e can no longer justify the intention of 
conveying our ideas to receivers (as though ideas could 
be wrapped in little packages by means of words)”.40 
Since learning can only occur through construction of 
knowledge, teaching must involve learners as active 
participants. The role of the teacher thus changes from 
that of the sole and authoritative holder of knowledge 
that must be imprinted on the blank slates of her stu-
dents to a role of facilitator that must guide students’ 
own efforts at construction.41 Conversely, the learners’ 
roles change from passive recipients of information to 
active knowledge constructors who “are responsible for 
defending, proving, justifying, and communicating their 
ideas to the classroom community”.42 
Another important implication of construc tivism 
for teaching is the central role of context in learning. 
At the individual level, constructivism tells us that a 
particular learner’s own context is determinative of 
that learner’s construction of the knowledge being 
taught. The class experience is thus only a part of the 
learning process, with each student’s own existing 
knowledge base forming the crucial other part through 
which the new class experience is internalised to add 
to and reconstruct the learner’s knowledge, which may 
9result in learning. At the communal level, constructivism 
tells us that active engagement within the particular 
knowledge community defines learning so that the 
quality of learning depends largely on the communal 
context. The richer students’ engagement with the 
knowledge community is, the richer we can expect 
their learning to be. This again emphasises the need for 
active student engagement. Here constructivism aligns 
with notions of differentiated instruction that call for the 
use of different teaching strategies in order to enable 
students with unique learning styles to effectively engage 
in knowledge construction.43 But it also implies that the 
richness of the knowledge community becomes a key 
consideration in effective teaching. Since students learn 
by engaging, not just on a vertical level with the teacher 
but also critically on a horizontal level with peers,44 
diver sity in the learning community becomes a strength, 
even a prerequisite. As students actively engage with a 
greater variety of background experiences, that is with 
others that bring very different existing knowledge 
bases to the knowledge community, their own existing 
knowledge bases are increasingly challenged and the 
tension between their “existing personal models of 
the world and discrepant new insights”45 increases so 
that the struggle to reconcile these, which is the key 
to constructing new knowledge, intensifies and greater 
learning is facilitated. 
Finally, constructivism tells us that learning is not 
a simple linear process.46 Teaching thus cannot be 
conceptualised as a simple linear process of transferring 
information from the expert to the amateur in a one-
directional manner either. Learning and thus teaching 
is rather a complex process, nonlinear in nature.47 This 
implies that teaching must allow for difference; there 
cannot be only one way of doing or knowing. The 
teacher must actively recognise that her construction 
of knowledge is not the final word and that students’ 
constructions have legitimacy.48 Students’ own construc-
tion not only informs their own knowledge base but also 
contributes to the restructuring of the entire knowledge 
community’s construction, including that of the teacher. 
It is thus imperative that teaching should focus on the 
engagement and relationship among  members of the 
learning group. It is the engagement activity itself that is of 
value. In this way the multidimensionality of the learning 
process is facilitated. This realisation also reaffirms the 
insight that learning, and thus teaching, occurs not only 
in a vertical model but also in a horizontal one where 
everyone in the knowledge community learns from each 
other.49 Students’ engagement with each other is thus 
as important as engagement with the teacher and the 
materials. The complex nature of learning also implies 
that knowledge and its construction cannot be broken 
up into “discrete subskills” that can be taught separately 
and in isolation and that concepts cannot be taught 
out of context.50 It is only within context and within a 
relational network that knowledge can exist. Teaching a 
particular body of knowledge should thus proceed from 
this relational perspective. 
I think the potential of constructivist pedagogies 
for transformative legal education should already be 
evident. Such pedagogy emphasises the central role of 
context, which we have seen is also a key concern in 
transformative constitutionalism. The learning process, 
including the knowledge constructed, is conceptualised 
as socially contingent, which affirms the view of law 
as a social construct. This pedagogy opens the door 
to contextual influences outside the strict confines of 
legal doctrine and embraces an approach that draws 
attention to both the real-world grounding of law and its 
relationship with other disciplines. It is a pedagogy that 
involves teaching law in a much broader social context. 
It also defies an atomistic approach to the various 
branches of the law in favour of a holistic view, a view 
that attempts to ground the learning of legal rules within 
the broader legal framework, highlighting the relationship 
between different rules and branches of law rather than 
only the isolated technical dimensions of the particular 
rule or branch.51 Constructivism furthermore allows 
for the acceptance, even the embrace, of divergence. 
Since constructivist pedagogy does not insist on a single 
correct approach or answer, students are encouraged 
to conceptualise the discipline in divergent ways. In this 
way, students can become much more comfortable with 
pluralism and conflict in a pluralist legal system such 
as ours. 
As noted above, our biggest challenge in teaching law 
in a manner true to transformative constitutionalism is 
to reflect the culture of justification and reject a culture 
of authority in the way that we teach. Constructivist 
pedagogy allows us to do exactly that. It enables a form of 
“epistemological democracy” in which teaching “serve[s] 
ends opposed to the ‘colonization of the knowledge of 
students by that of scholars’”.52 In this pedagogy, not 
only can we tell students about the value of searching 
for justification for legal rules as opposed to simply 
accepting their authority; we can also show students how 
it is done by teaching in that manner. Thus, when, under 
constructivist pedagogy, the teacher is no longer the 
sole authoritative figure in the class presenting students 
with ready-made knowledge for them to simply accept 
but the process of learning occurs by students engaging 
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with the materials and each other and forming their own 
constructions that they must justify within the knowledge 
community,53 guided by the teacher using a set of explicit 
and clear normative values, the students learn the law in 
the way that the law is supposed to function as envisaged 
by transformative constitutionalism. Students learn that 
the authority of a position rests on the justification for 
that view and not on the command behind it.
Constructivist pedagogies also create scope for 
cre ativity. By viewing the learning process as one of 
constructing new knowledge and rejecting a single 
‘correct’ construction of knowledge, the possibility 
for imagining new ways of doing things is significantly 
enhanced. This, as we have seen, is another critical 
imperative of transformative constitutionalism. Again, 
the value of such pedagogy is not only that it creates 
the scope for innovation in the classroom but also that 
it inculcates in students the necessity of and ability to 
approach law creatively. 
Eventually constructivism focuses the attention 
on how learning occurs,54 in other words, how it is 
that through engagement in a teaching environment 
a student can learn something. The result is that by 
adopting constructivist pedagogy, we can become much 
more sensitive to the underlying process of teaching and 
learning and its socio-cultural characteristics. We are 
forced to engage with our assumptions about knowledge, 
learning and our students. This self-awareness can help 
us to unmask “characteristic rhetorical strategies” and 
“professional norms”55 in legal education that we may 
consider “natural and fixed” but that are indeed socio-
culturally contingent and that may stand in the way of 
true transformation. Constructivism thus allows us to 
critically interrogate our legal culture as teachers of 
law, which forms a key part of the reassessment of legal 
culture generally under transformative constitutionalism. 
The significant overarching promise of constructivist 
approaches to legal education is that all of these benefits 
are embedded in the way that law is taught. Thus by 
joining the substantive commitments of the governing 
theory of our discipline with pedagogy, these advantages, 
aligned as they are to the project of transformative 
constitutionalism, will as a result become part of our 
students’ paradigm of the law. 
There is, however, a particular danger that con-
structivist pedagogies may reinforce the privileging of 
certain skills and forms of knowledge that may again 
lead to exclusion of alternatives, the very thing that 
constructivist pedagogies aim to avert.56 The realisation 
of this threat in legal education would of course 
also be destructive of the project of transformative 
constitutionalism. This danger lies in the possibility that 
constructivist pedagogy may not pay sufficient attention 
to those skills necessary to participate in the knowledge 
community and thus to learn. Popkewitz argues that 
discourses in constructivist pedagogies regarding 
active learner participation “generate principles which 
classify and divide those who have and do not have the 
appropriate dispositions, sensitivities, and capabilities 
to act and participate”.57 As a result, “exclusions 
are produced through the systems of recognition, 
divisions, and distinctions that construct reason and 
the reasonable person”.58 Critically, these divisions may 
not be explicitly acknowledged and may seem natural 
rather than socially constructed as they are.59 Other 
commentators have noted similar challenges in adopting 
constructivist pedagogies. In particular, the central 
notion of constructivism that one learns by assimilating 
new experiences into one’s existing knowledge base 
implies that a teacher must have an accurate view of a 
student’s existing knowledge base in order to assist that 
student to effectively engage with new experiences that 
can lead to learning.60 If the teacher operates on false 
assumptions about students’ existing knowledge base, a 
constructivist pedagogy may inhibit learning and exclude 
those students for whom the baseline assumptions are 
incorrect. This is particularly important when dealing 
with a diverse student body in which students do not 
share the same background experiences. Exclusion 
can quite easily occur in such classrooms where a 
par ticular “normalized vision of the natural” student 
predominates.61 However, there are a number of stra-
tegies to address these challenges. 
Firstly, the problem of underlying and implicit 
assumptions regarding what is considered as reason 
within a particular knowledge community and the 
appropriate tools to justify particular constructions of 
knowledge may be countered by retaining a dynamic 
vision of the discipline at issue. Transformative legal 
education thus involves both dynamic visions of law as 
a discipline in terms of transformative constitutionalism 
and the process of learning by adopting constructivist 
pedagogy. While the latter functions to open up 
the teaching and learning process, adherence to 
transformative constitutionalism ensures that the 
knowledge field, law, is not viewed as stable, fixed or 
one-dimensional, thus keeping open the possibility for 
radically different constructions. Accordingly, no single 
conception of justification is privileged.
A second strategy to avoid these dangers is obviously 
to develop a more accurate view of students’ knowledge 
base. This brings us to our third theme, a focus on 
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learners. Since it is critical in adopting a constructivist 
pedagogy for teachers to better understand their stu dents’ 
backgrounds and, importantly, students’ ex pe riences of 
knowledge construction, we need to interrogate our own 
assumptions about how students approach knowledge 
and consider whether these assump tions are still accurate. 
As Von Glasersfeld notes, a constructivist orientation 
may “bring the realization that students perceive their 
environment in ways that may be very different from 
those intended by the educators”.62
EDUCATION AND STUDENTS’ 
KNOWLEDGE WORLD 
While I think that one should be careful not to jump to conclusions about the traits of a new generation 
of students currently entering higher education, variously 
called the digital, Net or Google generation or in Marc 
Prensky’s evocative words “digital natives”,63 and the de-
mands of this new generation on education,64 there does 
seem to be rapidly growing consensus across a wide field 
of commentators that some rather big changes in dealing 
with knowledge are afoot. Leading scholars from diverse 
backgrounds, such as Oxford neuroscientist Baroness 
Susan Greenfield65 and director of the library of Alexandria 
Prof Ismail Serageldin,66 tell us that the impact of the digital 
revolution on our society and in particular on the way we 
engage with knowledge is not simply a quantitative change 
but a qualitative one. It is a change that touches the very 
nature of our perception of knowledge. Greenfield talks 
of a “mind change” as the cognitive equivalent of climate 
change, and Serageldin argues: 
We are on the cusp of a profound transformation of 
how knowledge is structured, accessed, manipulated 
and understood, how it is added to, and how it is 
displayed and communicated, that is the most pro-
found transformation in the history of humanity since 
the invention of writing.67
The differences between engaging with information in 
printed form and in digital form indeed seem profound. 
Looking at these differences and their impact on our 
knowledge experiences, it may not be an overstatement 
to say that the hold of Gutenberg on our intellectual 
endeavours has been broken by the advent of digital 
technologies.68 The dominance of the printed word 
over our knowledge construction following Gutenberg’s 
invention of the letterpress led to a “literary and linear” 
paradigm of knowledge.69 This paradigm has shaped the 
way we conceive of knowledge and physically how our 
brains engage with the construction of knowledge. As a 
result, Nicholas Carr states:
For the last five centuries ... the linear, literary mind 
has been at the center of art, science, and society ... 
it’s been the imaginative mind of the Renaissance, 
the rational mind of the Enlightenment, the 
inventive mind of the Industrial Revolution, even 
the subversive mind of Modernism. It may soon be 
yesterday’s mind.70
Digital technologies, and in particular the Internet, 
offer us a very different paradigm of knowledge. While 
initially digital information closely resembled printed 
form, something which is reflected in terminology such 
as web pages and bookmarks, the digital form has now 
departed radically from its print counterpart. Hyperlinks 
and search functions allow us to zoom in directly on 
relevant bits of information within a text, radically 
changing our mode and speed of access. These functions 
also allow us to directly experience the links between 
different texts. A direct and immediate engagement with 
the relationship between distinct bits of information 
becomes possible. As Serageldin notes, this changes our 
conception of knowledge from a bricks-in-a-wall model 
whereby distinct parts form the whole to a more fluid 
view, such as water flowing in a river, with much more 
dynamic and interrelated qualities.71 Even just the activity 
of scrolling and clicking through a digital document as 
opposed to turning the pages of a book is a very different 
form of engagement.72 
But the format of digital information, particularly on 
the Net, is also now far removed from printed text. 
A typical web page contains many different areas of 
distinct but mostly related fragments of information. 
At the same time, the PC allows us to simultaneously 
juggle between different information sources fulfilling 
different functions and, significantly, to integrate these 
distinct nodes of information.73 The conventional form 
of information is also no longer restricted to text, and 
the interaction among text, graphics, sound and video 
has become commonplace.74 Even the relationship 
between these different formats of information may be 
different in digital form as compared to print. Whereas 
in print we would mostly consider text to be the primary 
vehicle for conveying information with graphics as a 
secondary format mostly utilised to illustrate the text,75 
the relationship may be exactly the opposite in digital 
format, with graphics, sound and video playing a much 
more central role and text, especially large portions 
of text, increasingly taking a backseat in representing 
information. 
Not only is the way we access information electronically 
radically different from traditional print form but also 
the way we create information. Unlike creating a text 
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in print, electronic texts are not static.76 An author can 
constantly change the published text and automatically 
update readers’ version of it. This “provisional nature of 
digital text” inevitably impacts on the way that an author 
approaches the text and the creative process.77 But 
perhaps one of the most significant differences between 
engaging with knowledge in print and digital forms is that 
in the electronic paradigm the engagement becomes 
“bidirectional”.78 Digital platforms can allow users to 
actively engage with information. Unlike print form, the 
digital form thus greatly enhances activity on the part of 
the user. She can comment directly on a piece and add 
to an evolving text. Some sources of information, such 
as Wikipedia, allow readers to continuously participate 
in the creation and revision of the source. Carr notes 
in his 2010 work that “[m]any observers believe it’s 
only a matter of time before social networking functions 
are incorporated into digital readers, turning reading 
into something like a team sport.”79 The iPad and its 
rivals have indeed now made this prediction a reality. 
This interactivity enabled by the digital revolution is 
not restricted to textual knowledge experiences. Many 
nontextual activities hitherto regarded as largely passive 
encounters, such as attending the theatre or a musical 
recital, can be converted into interactive experiences 
with reliance on digital media. An audience can, for 
example, interact with an orchestra by means of cell 
phone requests, or a theatre audience can engage in 
discussion of a play in real time using social networks 
such as Twitter.80 
These examples of differences between traditional 
forms of knowledge experiences, primarily through the 
printed word, and digital experiences, predominantly 
by means of the Internet, signal a shift from a largely 
linear conception of knowledge to a more relational or 
networked paradigm. My purpose is not to engage in a 
normative debate about this shift. Whether this is a good 
or bad development, only time will tell, and it is probably 
far too early to form any firm views on the issue, given 
that the Internet has only been around for 20 years and 
in South Africa Internet usage probably lags considerably 
behind that in Europe and North America where much 
of the debate is situated. For our purposes, it is sufficient 
to simply note this change as something that is indeed 
happening. Our question is rather what the implications 
of such a change may be for transformative legal edu-
ca tion that embraces constructivist pedagogy. We 
noted that this pedagogy takes as a point of departure 
each student’s own knowledge experience as the basis 
for learning. The question is thus what these changes 
mean for our understanding of our students’ existing 
knowledge bases as our point of departure in training a 
new generation of law students.
A number of recent studies have shown that reliance 
on electronic media, principally the Internet, for infor-
mation purposes significantly alters the way that people 
engage with knowledge. A 2006 study found that when 
people read text online, they do not follow a linear 
method, reading from side to side and from top to 
bottom as one would read printed text. Rather, they 
quickly scan pages in a movement pattern resembling 
the capital letter F.81 A study in 2008 concluded that 
the “[d]igital immersion” of the Net generation, those 
that grew up with the Internet, “has … affected the 
way they absorb information”.82 Rather than reading in 
the traditional fashion, they “skip around, scanning for 
pertinent information of interest”.83 Yet another study 
has shown that people rarely spend significant periods 
of time on a given webpage but rather bounce in and 
out of pages in a matter of seconds.84 It is thus not 
surprising that a major study by a group of researchers 
at University College London into the use of two re-
search sites concluded that “there are signs that 
new forms of ‘reading’ are emerging as users ‘power 
browse’ horizontally through titles, contents pages 
and abstracts going for quick wins”.85 These changes in 
information behaviour are not simply changes of habit 
that can be undone easily by subjecting the wayward to 
‘correct’ academic or information practices. In 2008 an 
experiment showed that people’s brain patterns actually 
changed because of Internet use.86 This study confirmed 
that knowledge experiences on the Internet result 
in very different areas of the brain being used than in 
traditional print-text reading. The changes in knowledge 
paradigm that the digital revolution is bringing about are 
thus deep-seated and fundamental.
Most of these studies and others87 have also shown 
that digital versions of knowledge experiences are 
second nature to the Net generation because of their 
much higher level of digital immersion and the fact that 
they have grown up in the digital era. In short, this 
generation views the digital experience of knowledge as 
the paradigm. Prensky’s metaphor of digital natives has 
become popular in describing this development. Digital 
is this new generation’s native tongue. In contrast, those 
of us that grew up before the advent of information 
technology but find ourselves nevertheless also in this 
new digital world are but “digital immigrants”88 or, 
as one of my older colleagues recently noted, digital 
refugees. We may operate in the digital world and even 
accept that we cannot escape it, but we will never be 
native speakers of the language of technology.89 For 
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us, the linearity of the old world of printed text will 
always remain the paradigm and thus inform our point 
of departure.
From an educational perspective, and in particular 
a constructivist one, the real difficulty thus lies in the 
realisation that “[o]ur students are no longer ‘little 
versions of us’”.90 This makes it particularly difficult 
for us to develop an understanding of our students’ 
knowledge base and their experiences of knowledge 
construction as prerequisites for effective constructivist 
teaching. The ongoing debates on and studies into the 
nature of knowledge construction in a digital paradigm 
should therefore be rich sources for developing effective 
teaching practices. As we have seen, this paradigm 
places a high premium on networked ways of thinking 
and the relationship between bits of information, on 
instant interaction and high levels of integration between 
different forms of engagement. It eschews linear, step-
by-step approaches and the stability or permanence 
of information. In my view, it is imperative that we 
incorporate these insights into our teaching strategies in 
order to effectively engage our students.
But in a country such as South Africa we cannot 
expect that our students will share uniform levels of 
digital immersion.91 As we strive to increasingly diversify 
our student body, we should expect that our students’ 
prior knowledge experiences, digital and nondigital, will 
vary significantly. Given the fundamental nature of the 
shift from print to digital engagements with information, 
these differences in knowledge bases are again not simply 
a matter of degree but indeed of paradigm. This means 
that we are dealing with a body of students who do not 
only exhibit varying degrees of mastery of particular 
skills sets, which we typically assume to be part of prior 
learning in higher education, but who also may not 
even share the same basic conception of knowledge. 
This realisation poses enormous challenges in designing 
learning experiences. The dangers of a pedagogy that 
assumes particular knowledge traits loom large here. We 
run the risk of either alienating our students by adopting 
an approach that seems foreign to them, given their 
radically different paradigm of knowledge engagement, 
or excluding students from learning by wrongly assuming 
that they are all digital natives.92 In most of our classes 
at present, I would suggest that we run both these risks.
These challenges also bring opportunities. The un-
even changes in students’ knowledge world both 
among themselves and compared to lecturers bring 
the importance of diversity in teaching to the fore. It 
makes teaching in a differentiated manner an imperative. 
It also reinforces the importance of horizontal learning 
in addition to vertical learning, so that students can 
learn from each other to enhance learning experiences 
that may otherwise fail to effectively engage them. 
The vastly different role of the teacher also becomes 
clear. It is no longer possible for us digital immigrants, 
or refugees, to be the sole authoritative figures in class 
given that at least some of our students’ fluency in a 
new knowledge paradigm far surpasses our own. This 
forces us into a teaching style that actively co-opts our 
students and makes them active partners in mediating 
learning experiences. And finally, these changes in 
knowledge worlds bring home the need to adopt a 
pedagogy that does not insist on a single correct way 
of doing things. As we have seen above, constructivist 
pedagogies offer us a methodology to capitalise on these 
opportunities thrown up by the challenges in a new 
knowledge world. But more than that, these challenges 
offer us opportunities to internalise the basic tenets of 
transformative constitutionalism in our method. As I 
have argued above, these shifts in teaching style align 
well with the shifts in our discipline necessitated by a 
new vision of law in South Africa. 
CONCLUSION
When we bring these insights from the three areas of legal education – our discipline, teaching and 
students – together, it seems to me that we have a 
unique opportunity, no, more than an opportunity, an 
obligation, in contemporary South African legal education 
to respond to various fundamental changes that we 
witness in society around us. Legal education stands at 
a unique crossroads in this regard. We are faced with 
a fundamental change in our discipline, not merely an 
adjustment of what was before but a paradigm shift in 
law and legal method; we are faced with a paradigm shift 
in teaching and learning, putting learning and the learner 
and her context at the centre, and we are faced with a 
paradigm shift in dealing with knowledge, moving from 
dominance of the printed word to digital immersion. All 
of these changes force us to critically reassess where we 
stand in legal education in relation to what is happening 
around us. Will we close our eyes to the paradigm shifts 
affecting every aspect of our craft, or will we engage 
with them?
In my view, all of this requires legal education to 
change and to change radically. But as responsible intel-
lectuals, it is also our duty to drive that change in terms 
of proper theoretical frameworks. In the absence of a 
guiding theoretical framework, the change will amount 
to little more than Cockrell’s rainbow jurisprudence, 
rainbow education perhaps, that “flit before our eyes like 
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rainbows, beguiling us with their lack of substance”93 and 
that projects a false sense of harmony where none exists 
or should exist. Thus, for change in legal education in 
South Africa to proceed responsibly, it must be grounded 
in theory. I believe that transformative legal education 
can provide us with such a theoretical framework. This 
framework embraces transformative constitutionalism 
as the guiding theory to our discipline, constructivist 
pedagogies as directing our teaching strategies and an 
acknowledgement of the advent of a fundamentally diffe-
rent notion of knowledge brought about by the digital 
revolution. Moreover, as I have attempted to show 
in this lecture, the theoretical insights from the three 
elements of legal education that I highlighted can all be 
aligned to the overarching aims of transformative con-
stitutionalism. Theory is thus important in teaching law.
Transformative legal education provides us with 
a theoretical framework to cope with the complexity 
inherent in the endeavour of legal education. It allows us 
to acknowledge that law as a means of organising society 
is mired in complexity, that the process of teaching and 
learning is a complex one and that the new knowledge 
world of our networked society brings out the complex 
nature of knowledge rather than suppresses it. But this 
theoretical framework also allows us to realise that the 
developments in the three areas of legal education do 
not result in a slide to extreme relativism. The embrace 
of complexity in all these areas, which lies at the heart 
of transformative legal education, does not undermine 
all authority and knowledge in favour of a view that 
‘anything goes’. As the late great Paul Cilliers tells us:
A complete relativist is in a way nothing but a dis-
illusioned foundationalist. One could, however, deny 
the existence of absolute points of reference, without 
slipping into relativism. From the structuralist and 
post-structuralist perspective, meaning, whether con-
ceived linguistically or socially, is generated through 
relationships of difference in a complex network of 
interaction. Meaning conceived in this way is neither 
arbitrary nor per definition unstable.94
In incorporating these insights from complexity theory 
into legal education, we have yet much to learn from 
Cilliers, but that is a discussion for another day.
If we are serious about societal change grounded 
in law in South Africa, law teachers must consciously 
assume their role in the transformative project. We 
must acknowledge that the way we go about teaching 
law will shape the next generation’s perception of law 
and its role in this country. Neil Gold states that law 
teachers’ “ways of behaving are metastatements about 
law, lawyering and justice” to our students.95 He thus 
concludes that “[c]onsciousness about teaching makes 
it more likely that we will be intentional in respect of 
both content and form in our instruction”.96 Seventeen 
years into our democracy, I think that it is high time 
that we as law teachers start to critically ask what we 
are doing in our classes to further the cause of the 
Constitution’s “enterprise of inducing large-scale social 
change through nonviolent political processes grounded 
in law”97 towards a “society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights”.98
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